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This paper examines the relationship between state-funded secondary
school performance and local residential property values in seven major
English cities. When choosing which secondary school they wish their
children to attend, parents will be aware of the school’s performance in
Key Stage 3, GCSE and A- level examinations. We suggest that GCSE
examination results will be the measure of school performance that
parental choice will be most closely correlated with. Therefore,
secondary schools with good GCSE examination results will be
‘oversubscribed’ in that more students will wish to attend these schools
than there are places available. Schools will then have to develop
mechanisms for rationing the available places - central to rationing
strategies in English schools at the moment is geographical proximity of
the family home to the school of choice. Parents will thus have a strong
incentive to purchase houses in the ‘catchment’ area of high performing
schools. Our results suggest that this is the case, with high performing
schools stimulating a price premium in local residential property markets
of between 1% and 3% for each additional 10% point improvement in the
pass rate in GCSE examinations.
Keywords: Hedonic, capitalisation of school performance, property
prices.
JEL Classification: R23, R53, and I20.
1. Introduction
Stephen Gibbons and Stephen Machin (2008) state that anecdotal
evidence, media reports, and even dinner party discussions lend credence
to the claim that good schools raise local house prices. The capitalisation
of school performance into local property values has been the subject of a
number of studies in the US and latterly in the UK. Typically, these
studies have been cross-sectional and have found a positive relationship
between a chosen measure of standardised student test scores
performance and local residential property values.
The 1988 Education Reform Act introduced the national curriculum into
English schools and legislated for the provision of testing of school
3children at ages 7, 11 and 14 at the end of Key Stages 1, 2 and 3
respectively. Students would then typically complete GCSE (General
Certificate of Secondary Education) examinations at the end of Key Stage
4, aged 16. The Act placed a focus on measuring the outputs of state-
funded education in England at the end of all four Key Stages. This
reflected a general concern on the part of those legislating to provide
outputs from the state education system which would equip the UK labour
force with the skills, knowledge and competencies necessary to drive
economic growth in an increasingly competitive global economy (Tom
Elkins and John Elliott, 2004).
The introduction of testing of school pupils at ages 7, 11 and 14, as well
as public examinations at GCSE and A-level (at age 18), has provided a
wealth of information on the performance of school children at specific
stages of their school lives. In addition, the formal inspection of schools
by OFSTED (Office for Standards in Education) has provided additional
detailed information on the performance of children, teaching staff and
management in state-funded schools. This has given parents a plethora of
data upon which to assess the performance of schools. Furthermore, these
data are readily available to parents at the Department for Children,
Schools and Families (DCSF) web site.
The single measure of school performance employed in this paper is the
percentage of students gaining five or more GCSE passes at grades A* -
C in any one year. Full performance results (discussed later) are
published each year by the DCSF (now referred to as the Department for
Education). It is reasonable to suggest, by implication, that good school
performance will enhance future job possibilities. However, this
particular relationship is outside the scope of this study.
This paper is concerned with the impact of state-funded secondary school
performance on house prices in the owner-occupied sector in seven major
cities/urban conurbations in England – Greater London, Birmingham,
Bristol, Leeds, Greater Manchester, Liverpool and Newcastle. State-
funded schools account for well over 90% of the total student population
(see Chris Ryan and Luke Sibieta, 2010) while owner-occupied housing
represents 87% of all properties (see Kathleen Scanlon and Christine
Whitehead, 2004). These cities have been selected on the basis of
geographical diversity and because they represent some of the largest
conurbations in England.
4The cities are analysed separately because we wish to allow for the fact
that housing markets in different parts of the country may capitalise
school performance to a different extent. For a discussion and justification
of this approach involving segmentation of the database into a number of
metropolitan areas see David M Brasington and Diane Hite (2005).
The structure of the paper is as follows: the next section provides a review
of the literature on the capitalisation of school performance into
residential property prices, focusing on the so-called hedonic approach to
measurement (the methodology adopted in this study). Section 3
describes the data employed and the main procedures adopted to render it
suitable for statistical analysis. Section 4 outlines the modelling
framework adopted, while Section 5 discusses the main empirical results.
Finally, Section 6 draws together the main conclusions and findings.
2. Literature Review
The value which parents place on good school performance would be
easy to assess if education services were sold in a free and competitive
market. However, since there is no observable market price for state-
provided schooling, an indirect method must be found to place a
monetary value on the services provided by state-funded schools.
The hypothesis we are proposing in this paper is that, ceteris paribus, a
higher level of school performance will be capitalised into higher
property values. In other words, parents wishing to gain access to schools
with a superior academic performance will bid up the price of properties
which are most geographically proximate to a high performing school.
They will do this in order to ensure that their children are in the
catchment area of the high performing/oversubscribed school and are
therefore eligible for entry into that school (for a general discussion of the
capitalisation of spatially differentiated environmental amenities – as in
this study involving property prices, neighbourhood characteristics and
school performance – see Sherwin Rosen (1974) and Roland Benabou
(1996)).
In reviewing the literature related to this study we are mindful of three
key issues. The first is concerned with the question of what parents are
implicitly purchasing when they buy a house proximate to a high
performing school; that is, what is the most appropriate measure of ‘good’
5school performance? Secondly, what conditions are necessary in a local
housing market for ‘good school performance’ to be capitalised into
residential property prices? Finally, what are the methodological issues
faced by researchers attempting to model such a relationship?
A body of literature has focused on what parents are buying when they
select schools for their children. In this context Thomas A Downes and
Jeffrey E Zabel (2002) in their study of the impact of school
characteristics on house prices in Chicago found that homeowners paid
attention to school outputs, i.e. test scores, and not inputs in the form of
per pupil expenditures by schooling authorities. David M Brasington and
Donald R Haurin (2006) examined the extent to which homeowners
valued traditional measures of school performance (absolute test scores)
of which the UK’s GCSE examination pass rates are an example. These
traditional measures contrast with the relatively new value-added
measures of school quality, which attempt to measure the capability of
students as they enter the secondary schooling process and compare this
with the test scores on exit, the difference between the two being the
value added. With this approach it is the measure of value added which
acts as a measure of school quality rather than the absolute performance at
the end of the process.
Whilst educationalists may argue that the value-added approach
represents a much more effective evaluation of school performance,
Brasington and Haurin (2006) report that homeowners value average test
scores and levels of expenditure on education above any measure of
student value-added when assessing local school performance. They
argue, therefore, that it is average test scores which are capitalised into
local property prices rather than value-added measures of school
performance.
In relation to what conditions must exist in the local housing market for
good school performance capitalisation to occur David A Starrett (1981),
David E Wildasin (1987), William H Hoyt (1999) and Christian A L
Hilber and Christopher C J Mayer (2002) all argue that where there is a
relatively inelastic supply of housing, land and house prices will rise in
those areas which provide relatively more attractive amenities, to the
point where the additional price paid reflects the perceived additional
value of high-quality local amenities. The capitalisation of local amenities
and neighbourhood effects into residential property values has been
6widely researched in the USA. Brasington (2002) provides a thorough
overview of the capitalisation debate, the key point being that
capitalisation of any differential in local amenity is contingent upon a
supply of housing which is inelastic with respect to price. However, Paul
Cheshire and Stephen C Sheppard (2004) challenge this view and argue
instead that differences in housing supply elasticities do not imply
different levels of capitalisation. In particular, they point out that ‘it is
possible that observed reductions in capitalisation might exist for other
reasons, related to the availability of substitute sources of education,
variations in the physical characteristics of the housing stock making it
more or less suitable for accommodating children or the degree of
uncertainty attached to current measures of school quality’ (pp. 400-1).
Furthermore, Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) concur with Timothy J
Bartik (1988) who argues that it is the elasticity of supply of the local
amenity, in this paper good schooling, that will influence the extent of
capitalisation. On this basis we might expect a reduction in the premium
paid for good school performance, as the average level of school
performance increases.
Some of the literature in this area focuses upon the inter-temporal nature
of the capitalisation of improved local amenity. Bartik (1988) identifies a
three stage process. In the first instance there is an improvement in local
amenity. This is followed by a second stage whereby the improvement in
local amenity is recognised by those agents who are active in the local
property market. The third stage involves these agents reflecting
improvements in local amenity in their willingness to pay a premium for
properties that embody the improved local amenity. This process is
important in the context of this study. Schools are incentivised to improve
the academic performance of their students in public examinations; this
improved performance is then reported in official statistics released by the
DCSF and, finally, house buyers can be expected to react to the improved
school performance in their willingness to pay for properties which are
proximate to the high performing schools.
Finally, there is a rich literature dealing with the capitalisation of
secondary school performance on residential property prices based on the
so-called hedonic approach to measurement in which the sale price of a
property is a function of the physical characteristics of the house as well
as its environmental amenities and location. Lori L Taylor (2005) and Ian
7Davidoff and Andrew Leigh (2007) provide reviews of this literature,
citing studies by Cheshire and Shepherd (2002, 2004); Gibbons and
Machin (2003, 2006); Leslie Rosenthal (2003); Patrick J Bayer, Robert
McMillan and Fernando V Ferreira (2003); Sandra E Black (1999);
Downes and Zabel (2002); Thomas J Kane, Douglas O Staiger and,
Stephanie K Riegg (2005); Randall Reback (2005); David L Weimer and
Michael J Wolkoff (2001); Kathy J Hayes and Lori L Taylor (1996);
Brian A Cromwell and William T Bogart (1997); Haurin and Brasington
(1996) and Dennis Leech and Erick Campos (2003).
A fundamental challenge facing the hedonic approach in this context is to
ensure that neighbourhood quality is correctly modelled. Failure to do so
would result in biased estimates of the impact of local school quality
(performance) on local house prices. Specifically, as Black (1999)
indicates, the standard hedonic approach will produce upwardly bias
estimates of the impact of school performance on house prices if there are
unobserved neighbourhood characteristics that are correlated with school
quality and likely to influence house prices. Residential property prices
reflect not only the characteristics of the properties themselves but also
those of the surrounding neighbourhood – and it is reasonable to assume
that higher status neighbourhoods tend to have better schools due to the
pupils’ family backgrounds, the general quality of teachers, resources
paid for by parents etc. Theodore M Crone (1998) argues that empirical
evidence is available to show that academic achievement can be improved
by the peer group effect. The existence of this ‘endogeneity problem’ can
be addressed in a number of ways.
Davidoff and Leigh (2007) indicate there are four broad approaches to
tackling the ‘endogeneity problem’. One approach is to control for
variation in neighbourhood effects by using data relating to properties
adjacent to but on opposite sides of school catchment boundaries - see
Black (1999) and Gibbons and Machin (2003, 2006). In doing so, this
approach implicitly controls for differences in neighbourhood quality by
assuming that such properties will have identical neighbourhood
characteristics. This approach, however, does not take into account
distance between properties on either side of the school catchment
boundaries and the fact that properties at opposite ends of a particular
school catchment boundary may exhibit very different and perhaps
unobservable neighbourhood characteristics.
8A second approach is to investigate whether the data allow for any
‘natural experiments’ such as changes in school quality over a number of
years, schools which may have been closed, opened or other changes in
their characteristics and to investigate whether property prices follow
such changes. This approach is adopted by Kane, Staiger and Riegg
(2005) and Reback (2005). The weakness of this approach is that it
assumes that the mix of neighbourhood characteristics does not change
over time.
A third approach is do adopt an instrumental variables methodology
which predicts residential property values independent of school
performance and then rigorously tests for school quality effects. An
example of this approach can be found in Rosenthal (2003) who uses
government inspections as an instrument for school quality. As Gibbons
and Machin (2008) suggest the challenge for such an approach is to find
appropriate instruments which are causally related to variations in school
performance while ‘otherwise unrelated to housing prices’.
The fourth approach, and the one adopted in this study, is to explicitly
include variables which measure the ‘quality’ of the residential
neighbourhood which may change over time alongside information
concerning the physical characteristics of houses and the performance of
the closest school. Examples of this approach include Weimar and
Wolkoff (2001) and Downes and Zabel (2002). As noted above it is vital
that the effect of neighbourhood characteristics is correctly modelled.
The study reported in this paper seeks to make a contribution to this
expanding area of research. This contribution can be gauged in a number
of ways: we employ (a) a data set which has exceptional breadth and
depth; (b) we explicitly incorporate neighbourhood characteristics effects,
thereby addressing the endogeneity issue common to studies of this kind;4
(c) our ability to disaggregate the data set across different metropolitan
areas allows for housing market segmentation and (d) the inter-temporal
nature of our data set allows us to model the impact of changes in average
4 We acknowledge the comments made by a referee concerning the importance of
addressing the problem of endogeneity in studies of this kind. The depth and quality of
the data set employed here has allowed us to control for the physical house and
neighbourhood environmental characteristics in a way that ensures that parameter
estimates on our focus variable (school performance) are not upwardly biased (see
Section 5 below for additional discussion of the empirical results).
9school performance and changes in neighbourhood composition over
time.
3. Description of the Dataset
The results reported in this paper are based on an exceptionally large
dataset developed by HBoS (the largest residential mortgage lender in the
UK). The dataset covers all the house purchase transactions on which the
HBoS plc group has provided mortgage loans although for the purpose of
this paper, we have only selected data for the years 2001 to 2007. This
period is chosen as a result of a desire to present estimations of
capitalisation which are contemporary rather than historical and,
following Bartik (1988), a desire to allow for a period of time to elapse
whereby house purchasers were fully aware of differing school
performances and could reflect this in their willingness to pay for
properties.
Data on School Quality
In the analysis below the data on ‘school quality’ measure the
performance of individual schools in terms of the percentage of students
attaining five passes at GCSE grades A* to C. This percentage score was
entered as a continuous variable in our preferred hedonic house price
regression model. The data on school performance was obtained from the
DCSF website for the years 2000-2006. The website also provided us
with the required locational data in terms of the postcode of each school.
In order to allow for the capitalisation of school performance into
property prices we have lagged the school performance data one time
period. Thus, we have regressed 2002 property prices on 2001 school
performance results. The rationale for this approach is that it is historical
school performance data that will impact current offer prices for
residential properties. In addition, we are suggesting that it is the most
recent historical school performance data that will have the most
immediate impact on the price offered by house purchasers. We
experimented with three-year moving averages of school performance but
found that school performance in the previous year performed more
effectively as an explanatory variable.
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Data on Physical House Characteristics
The data on physical house characteristics is provided from the HBoS
mortgage data set. The richness of the dataset allows us to analyse the
impact of school performance on residential property values to an extent
which we feel has not been possible for researchers previously in the UK.
The database includes a detailed breakdown of the information on the
following house characteristics:
 purchase price of the property recorded at the mortgage approval
stage
 property type, ie. whether the house is detached, semi-detached,
terraced, bungalow, flat or maisonette;
 number of habitable rooms;
 floor space area;
 number of bathrooms;
 number of toilets;
 availability of central heating;
 number of garages and garage spaces;
 garden;
 age of property.
Data on Neighbourhood Characteristics
Over and above these physical house characteristics, the database also
includes information on the location of each property in terms of
postcodes. In order to locate each property and each school in our
dataset, we employed Royal Mail Post Office postcodes. We then utilised
the Royal Mail's POSTZON software to provide us with an Ordnance
Survey (OS) grid map reference. This grid reference effectively places
each property on the bottom left-hand corner of a 100 metre by 100 metre
grid. To each of the Eastings and Northings of the OS grid reference a
five was added, which effectively located each of our properties at the
centre of the 100 metre by 100 metre grid; i.e., at the expected location of
any property within a 100 metre grid. We then developed a simple
computer macro which applied Pythagoras's theorem and calculated the
straight line distance between each property in the dataset and the nearest
school.
Rosenthal (2003) reports that POSTZON locates each school and house
within a maximum of 70 metres of its true location and concludes that for
the purpose of locating the nearest school to a given residential property,
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the use of the POSTZON database is unlikely to result in a serious
misallocation of houses to the nearest school. Gibbons and Machin (2008)
suggest that a lack of clearly defined catchment areas for state schools
introduces an amount of ambiguity in the link between residential
property locations and accessibility to school. However, of primary
interest to this study is the motivation for parents to purchase a property
close to their school of choice. Parents will do this when they believe that
a school is oversubscribed and that the criteria which may be applied to
their child’s application for entry, in extremis, is straight line distance
from the family home to the school of choice. Interestingly, the incentive
to purchase a house close to a ‘high performing’ school may be greater in
households where the oldest child is about to enter secondary education
and there are younger brothers and sisters. In this case the ‘straight line
distance’ criteria may be applied to the eldest child but subsequent
children would be ‘guaranteed’ a place on the basis that an elder brother
or sister attended the school. We have not been able to control for this
effect in this study.
The dataset also includes a special locational classification regime used in
the UK, known as ACORN, A Classification of Residential
Neighbourhoods – for the full details of the ACORN classification
system, based on postcodes, see CACI (2006). This regime allocates
ratings according to geo-demographic information, allowing for the
categorisation of the location of each property at two levels: at the micro
level (immediate residential neighbourhood) and at the macro level (wider
surrounding area). In our study the inclusion of ACORN codes, in so far
as they allow for the influence of the socioeconomic characteristics of a
neighbourhood population, should pick up some of the so-called peer
group affects; ie, our study allows for the socio-economic impacts on
school performance noted by Crone (1998).
Based on postcode information, the location of each property is classified
into one of eight main ACORN groups as shown in Table 1 below.
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Table 1: Description of Main ACORN Groups
ACORN
Group
Main Characteristics of Group
A Areas where residents are wealthy investors
B Prospering families
C Areas of traditional money
D Young urbanites
E F G Areas of middle-aged families (comfortable), contented
pensioners and families and individuals looking to settle
down (Middle Aged Comfort (E), Contented Pensioners
(F) and Settling down (G))
H Moderate living
I K Meagre means and impoverished pensioners
J Inner city existence (low income singles and couples,
multi ethnic young singles renting flats, high rise
poverty – dependent on welfare-poor young –
financially inactive)
Finally, it should be noted that prior to estimation the dataset has been
‘cleansed’ to exclude properties which are atypical or can be described as
outliers as well as to take account of coding errors in the data entry
processes. In addition, houses are excluded if the nearest school is further
than 10 kilometres away in order to provide an outer boundary to the
urban conurbations that we have studied.
4. Modelling Framework
In this study we employ the hedonic approach to pricing to determine a
monetary valuation which parents place on the performance of schools.
The hedonic method makes use of information on property prices (Pit)
and property characteristics to determine the value of individual
attributes. These attributes include physical attributes of a particular
house (denoted by Xht ) as described earlier, as well as neighbourhood
variables (Xnt ), and environmental variables (Xet ) which in this study
include the ‘quality’ of the most proximate state school.
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Thus the general hedonic price model to be estimated is as follows:
Pit = f (Xht, Xnt, Xet, eit) (1)
where:
Pit = house price i in time period t
Xht = physical housing characteristics
Xnt = neighbourhood (location) characteristics
Xet = environmental characteristics
eit = unmeasured factors
By regressing the physical, neighbourhood and environmental
characteristics of a set of properties against the purchase price as the
dependent variable, it is possible to calculate implicit prices for each of
the characteristics.5
It should be noted that in hedonic estimation attention must be given to
the choice of an appropriate functional form, the optimal combination of
explanatory variables and the potential problem of multicollinearity. Tests
developed by George E P Box and D R Cox (1964) are employed in this
study and resulted in a semi-log specification as the most appropriate
functional form. This particular functional form has the advantage of ease
of interpretation of parameter estimates. Analyses were also carried out to
determine the optimal combinations and appropriate transformations of
the explanatory variables in the regression model. In particular, the results
showed that floor area consistently outperforms the number of habitable
rooms in explaining house prices.
With such a rich data set it is desirable to use as many variables as
possible to define our house price equation; however, in practice, some
explanatory variables may be correlated with each other – in other words,
the problem of multicollinearity may exist. Garrod and Willis (1992)
5 Hedonic pricing methods have also been employed to calculate the value of a wide
range of both “welcome” and “unwelcome” local amenities. These include aircraft noise
(Terrence J Levesque, 1994), air quality (Kenneth Y Chay and Michael Greenstone,
2004), hazardous waste sites (Jill J McCluskey and Gordon C Rausser, 2000), woodland
(Guy Garrod and Ken Willis, 1992) and the proximity of churches (A Quang Do, Robert
W Wilbur, James L Short, 1994; Thomas M Carroll, Terrance MClauretie, Jeff Jensen,
1996).
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indicate that multicollinearity is a common problem in hedonic price
functions and one which is often conveniently ignored. Tests for
multicollinearity were conducted based on the methodology outlined in
David A Belsey, Edwin Kuh and Roy E Welsch. (1980).
The performance of what Philip Graves et al (1988) term ‘focus’
variables – in this paper, the school performance variable - is of primary
importance. We experimented with dummy variables including those
which separated the dataset into discrete deciles and excluded the deciles
which included the national average and local average school
performances; we also experimented with excluding lower deciles and
higher deciles. Dummy variables were included to pick up the effect of
better than and worse than performances with respect to national and local
averages. In all of these cases the dummy variables failed to work as
effectively as the continuous specification of the school performance
variable that we ultimately included in our preferred equation.
Finally, as the preferred regression equation covered more than one time
period we have indexed the equation using the ‘time dummy’ method
(Michael C Fleming and Joseph G Nellis, 1985). Therefore, with time
incorporated as a dummy variable, percentage changes in price can be
observed directly as the coefficient on the time variable, our base year in
all cases being 2001.
5. Empirical Results
The final regression model uses the natural log of house price as the
dependent variable (ln P). Combinations of the following independent
variables were used: dummy variables to capture the impact of house type
(detached, semi-detached, terraced, flat and bungalow); the existence of a
garden; none or partial central heating; the age of the property (split into
five distinct classifications – properties built prior to 1919, properties
built between 1919-45, 1945-60, post-1960 and new build). A set of
ACORN ratings dummy variables was included to allow for variability in
neighbourhood characteristics while annual time dummy variables were
included to allow for the influence of inflationary effects over the period
2001-2007 not associated with the physical, neighbourhood or
environmental characteristics of the properties in our dataset. A dummy
variable was incorporated to link each property in our dataset with the
nearest secondary school. Continuous measures of numbers of
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bathrooms, toilets, garages and garage spaces and the size of a property,
which measures the internal floor space (measured in square metres) were
also included in the final equation. Our data set allowed us to experiment
with specifications which included the number of habitable rooms but this
specification was rejected in favour of a continuous floor space variable
on the basis of goodness-of-fit and the overall performance of other
variables in our preferred equation.
Therefore, the model provides an estimate of the influence of property
characteristics with reference to a ‘standard’ house (David Forrest et al
1996). In this study our standard property in each city was determined on
the basis of identifying the modal characteristics. Thus in all cities the
standard house had full central heating and no garden while the excluded
house types, house ages and ACORN types are reported in Table 2 below.
The modal characteristics are excluded from our equation and the
coefficients on the included dummy variables can be interpreted as a
percentage premium or discount relative to the excluded modal
characteristic.
Table 2: Excluded house type, house age and ACORN code by city
City House type House Age* ACORN
Birmingham Semi-detached 1960+ IK
Bristol Terraced Pre 1919 EFG
Leeds Terraced 1960+ IK
Liverpool Semi-detached 1960+ IK
London Flat Pre 1919 D
Manchester Terraced 1960+ IK
Newcastle Semi-detached 1960+ IK
*1960+ denotes properties built after 1960, but not new build.
The regression results are presented in the Appendix, Tables A – G for
each of the seven cities in turn.
Table 3 below reports the estimated regression coefficient on the school
performance variable in each of the seven cities along with the
corresponding average standard deviation. This allows us to report a
percentage house price premium for an additional one standard deviation
of school performance above the average in each city. The inclusion of
the average house price in each city in 2007 allows us to monetise the
premium for an additional one standard deviation of school performance
above the mean.
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Table 3: Coefficient on school performance variable and the
residential house price premium for a local school with GCSE


























Birmingham 0.001 17.31 +1.7% 197,086 3,350
Bristol 0.003 18.07 +5.4% 250,210 13,511
Leeds 0.002 18.33 +3.6% 178,284 6,418
Liverpool 0.001 21.08 +2.1% 188,378 3,956
London 0.001 18.64 +1.9% 367,029 6,973
Greater
Manchester
0.002 15.96 +3.2% 188,372 6,028
Newcastle 0.001 16.06 +1.6% 169,858 2,718
Source: average standard deviation based on authors’ calculations
employing DCSF data.
The above results suggest that in Birmingham, Liverpool, London and
Newcastle, for every 10% point improvement in the average GCSE pass
rate (% or more GCSEs at grades A*-C), property prices increase by 1%.
This would imply that, ceteris paribus, a school which had a pass rate of
80% would give rise to a local property price premium of 4% compared
to properties where the local state-funded secondary school had a pass
rate of 40%.
In order to facilitate comparison across a number of studies, Gibbons and
Machin (2008) and Davidoff and Leigh (2007) summarise the results of
various studies by reporting the percentage increase in house prices
stemming from an increase in school performance equivalent to one
standard deviation above the city mean. Table 3 shows the average
standard deviation of results, in each city, over the period of this study
and the resulting house price premia (in percentage terms) based on the
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school performance coefficients. For example, in Birmingham an
additional one standard deviation of school performance increases
residential property prices by 1.7% whereas in Bristol an additional
standard deviation of school performance increases property prices by
5.4%. In addition, Table 3 also shows the value of these house price
premia in absolute terms (£). Note that these premia are computed on the
basis of average house prices in each city in 2007 multiplied by the
corresponding percentage house price premium averaged over the seven
years of this study. It is clear from these results that the cost of ‘good’
education varies across the cities studied ranging from £2.7k in Newcastle
to £13.5k in Bristol. This would appear to justify our geographical
segmentation approach to modelling the relationship between school
performance and house prices. The monetary values attached to a one
standard deviation improvement would not appear to be out of line with
those reported by Black (1999) and Gibbons and Machin (2006).
Furthermore, in Greater London in 2006, DCSF statistics indicate that the
range of school performance varied from a pass rate of 21% for the lowest
performing school to 98% for the highest performing school. The house
price premia that the highest performing school generated in 2007
compared to the lowest performing school is approximately £33,400. This
is less than the comparable 2004 figure for Greater London of £61,000
reported by Gibbons and Machin (2008). This may be partially explained
by a greater range of school performance in 2004 (12%-99%) compared
to 2006 (22%-98%). It would also appear to be the case that our preferred
strategy for modelling neighbourhood characteristics has resulted in
coefficient estimates on the school performance variable which are not
upwardly biased.
Furthermore, the results provide some support for the assertion in the
hedonic literature that where the elasticity of supply of good schooling is
unresponsive then price premia will be greater. To illustrate this point,
Table 4 below reports the percentage of students obtaining 5 or more
GCSE’s at grades A* - C in the seven cities over the period 2000 to 2006.
Students’ performance in 2007 is not reported in this table as our model
suggests that house prices in any one year will be contingent upon the
previous year’s GCSE performance of the nearest state school. Table 4
shows that Bristol started and ended the period with the lowest average
school performance of the seven cities. This contrasts with Newcastle
which started the period with an unspectacular average performance but
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exhibited a much greater elasticity of supply of ‘good schools’ on the
basis of average school performance over the period.
Table 4: Percentage of students gaining five or more GCSE passes at
grades A* - C (2001-2006)
City 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Birmingham
Mean 35 36.9 41.3 46.1 48.1 53.9 56.7
Bristol
Mean 32 32.9 32.2 38 36.9 37.5 46.4
Leeds
Mean 37.7 38 39.6 43.2 45.2 50.3 52.3
Liverpool
Mean 34.9 36.7 39.5 41.7 45.3 51.6 57.2
London
Mean 43.2 44.6 47.3 50.2 53 54.9 58.1
Manchester
Mean 40.9 41.9 43.7 46 46.4 50.4 53.7
Newcastle
Mean 32.1 39.8 41.9 41 45.2 59.6 56.1
Source: Department for Children, Schools and Families (see
www.education.gov.uk/researchandstatistics/attainmenttables).
Finally, in order to examine the impact that including ACORN values had
on the school quality variable we estimated our hedonic equation with
housing characteristic variables only and then with housing characteristic
and ACORN values included. As Table 5 below indicates, in the cases of
Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Greater London, Manchester and Newcastle
the impact of adding ACORN codes was to reduce the coefficient on the
school performance variable, suggesting that any endogeneity issues that
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existed with respect to ‘neighbourhood quality’ in these local housing
markets have been (at worst, partially) accounted for.
Table 5: Comparison of School Quality coefficient when regression
model includes only housing characteristics variables with a
regression model including housing characteristic variables and











Birmingham School Quality 0.007 0.006
R² 0.577 0.639
Bristol School Quality 0.007 0.006
R² 0.586 0.636
Leeds School Quality 0.008 0.007
R² 0.536 0.587
Liverpool School Quality 0.005 0.005
R² 0.472 0.521
London School Quality 0.004 0.004
R² 0.571 0.629
Manchester School Quality 0.007 0.006
R² 0.537 0.574
Newcastle School Quality 0.004 0.003
R² 0.529 0.598
6. Summary and Conclusions
The results in this study provide robust evidence that the differences in
state-funded secondary school performance in GCSE examinations is
consistently capitalised into residential property prices; ie., residential
properties which are located proximate to high performing state-funded
secondary schools attract a price premium. The extent of the price
premium varies between different cities. In Greater London, Liverpool,
Birmingham and Newcastle a 10% point differential in GCSE
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performance produces a 1% point differential in residential properties
located close to the high performing school. In Greater Manchester and
Leeds the same differential in school performance produces a 2% point
increase in residential properties located close to the high performing
school, while in Bristol a 10% point differential in GCSE performance
produces a 3% point increase in residential properties located close to the
high performing school. Note that this implies that in Bristol a property
where the closest school had a pass rate of 80% compared to a property
where the closest school had a pass rate of 40% would attract a price
premium of 12% points, ceteris paribus. Using average prices in 2007
and the average percentage premia for an improvement in school
performance since 2001, we find that the value placed on ‘good
education’ in terms of a premium on house prices ranges from £13.5k in
Bristol to £2.7k in Newcastle.
We experimented with different representations of school performance.
Specifically, we examined if there were threshold values of GCSE pass
rates which defined a ‘good’ school. We also examined the relative
performance of schools to ascertain if a house price premium was paid for
an above local average or above national average performance. In all
cases none of the alternative specifications of school performance
produced superior results to our preferred specification. This reinforces
the suggestion that it is the absolute performance of the nearest state
funded secondary schools that parents focus upon when making house
purchasing decisions.
The cities which attracted the highest price premia for ‘good’ school
performance were those where the average pass rate in GCSE
examinations was the lowest. In other words, in those cities where the
supply of good schools was lower, the price premium for a ‘good’ school,
in terms of the rate at which school performance was capitalised into local
property prices, was higher. This finding has implications for students’
ability to access high performing schools, in so far as their parents have
an inability to pay the price premium required to purchase a house which
would guarantee access. The response of the current UK government to
the paradox of pupils being denied access to state-funded education due to
their parents ‘inability’ to pay a shadow price that exists in the local
residential property market is to introduce a lottery into the allocation of
places at ‘oversubscribed’ schools. We would suggest that this is
inappropriate in that it deals with the symptoms of the problem rather
21
than the causes. We would argue that the government should focus on
improving school quality as doing so would remove the extent of the
price premium that ‘high performing’ schools attract, thereby reducing
the extent to which students would be excluded from state-funded
secondary education because of their parents inability to ‘pay the price’ in
local residential property markets.
Finally, it may be the case that the private sector may be willing to fund
improvements in state-funded secondary schooling, as low performing
schools will mean that they may find it difficult to attract workers with
children of secondary school age to areas where secondary school
performance is poor. In such circumstances workers may require wages
which allow them to educate their children at private schools or in
extremis they may not move to a particular city. In addition, appropriate
public transport policy may enable students to access good performing
schools from a greater geographical distance and perhaps alleviate any
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Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 10.482 0.007 1398.444**
House Type
Detached 0.157 0.005 30.731**
Terraced -0.114 0.004 -30.089**
Bungalow 0.133 0.012 11.459**
Flat -0.200 0.006 -31.713**
Number of Bathrooms 0.116 0.004 31.813**
Number of Toilets 0.051 0.003 18.532**
Number of Garages 0.083 0.003 29.270**
Number of Garage Spaces 0.035 0.002 22.201**
Garden 0.106 0.008 14.004**
Size (in square metres) 0.003 0.000 72.675**
Availability of Central Heating
None -0.066 0.004 -17.616**
Partial -0.055 0.005 -11.718**
Age of Property
Pre-1919 0.070 0.005 15.173**
1919-1945 0.071 0.004 18.879**
1945-1960 0.029 0.005 6.248**
New 0.097 0.006 16.021**
Acorn Classification
A 0.617 0.007 83.179**
B 0.433 0.006 66.959**
C 0.435 0.008 57.806**
D 0.444 0.007 60.832**
EFG 0.284 0.004 71.109**
H 0.173 0.004 42.342**
J -0.035 0.005 -6.402**
Time
Yr 2002 0.234 0.006 41.514**
Yr 2003 0.417 0.005 76.379**
Yr 2004 0.515 0.006 93.308**
Yr 2005 0.580 0.005 110.609**
Yr 2006 0.624 0.005 119.508**
Yr 2007 0.669 0.005 129.969**




**Significant at the 5%, or higher level, of significance
27
Table B: Bristol
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 10.938 0.011 1031.013**
House Type
Detached 0.190 0.008 24.540**
Semi-detached 0.084 0.006 15.107**
Bungalow 0.125 0.013 9.278**
Flat -0.073 0.008 -8.813**
Number of Bathrooms 0.134 0.005 27.555**
Number of Toilets 0.061 0.004 14.417**
Number of Garages 0.089 0.004 22.016**
Number of Garage Spaces 0.034 0.003 13.584**
Garden -0.038 0.009 -4.268**
Size (in square metres) 0.003 0.000 56.701**
Availability of Central Heating
None -0.014 0.007 -2.098**
Partial -0.065 0.009 -7.418**
Age of Property
1919-1945 -0.048 0.007 -6.862**
1945-1960 -0.117 0.008 -14.913**
1960+ -0.123 0.006 -20.193**
New -0.103 0.009 -11.172**
Acorn Classification
A 0.252 0.010 25.580**
B 0.116 0.008 15.137**
C 0.103 0.011 9.386**
D 0.188 0.007 25.879**
H -0.068 0.006 -11.032**
IK -0.224 0.007 -34.156**
J -0.176 0.014 -12.246**
Time
Yr 2002 0.256 0.009 29.399**
Yr 2003 0.346 0.008 41.816**
Yr 2004 0.417 0.008 51.046**
Yr 2005 0.439 0.008 56.215**
Yr 2006 0.534 0.007 73.467**
Yr 2007 0.609 0.007 83.455**




**Significant at the 5%, or higher level, of significance.
28
Table C: Leeds
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 10.133 0.007 1466.668**
House Type
Detached 0.230 0.005 43.328**
Semi-detached 0.102 0.004 27.111**
Bungalow 0.217 0.007 30.926**
Flat 0.042 0.006 6.517**
Number of Bathrooms 0.139 0.004 38.986**
Number of Toilets 0.071 0.003 23.791**
Number of Garages 0.104 0.003 38.990**
Number of Garage Spaces 0.037 0.001 25.507**
Garden -0.025 0.006 -4.177**
Size (in square metres) 0.003 0.000 83.712**
Availability of Central Heating
None -0.103 0.003 -31.379**
Partial -0.074 0.006 -12.351**
Age of Property
Pre-1919 -0.005 0.004 -1.300
1919-1945 0.014 0.004 3.660**
1945-1960 -0.025 0.005 -5.289**
New 0.052 0.006 8.580**
Acorn Classification
A 0.612 0.007 84.666**
B 0.391 0.006 68.846**
C 0.391 0.007 52.240**
D 0.505 0.007 73.340**
EFG 0.288 0.004 77.070**
H 0.173 0.004 47.179**
J -0.082 0.007 -11.656**
Time
Yr 2002 0.211 0.005 40.816**
Yr 2003 0.402 0.005 80.616**
Yr 2004 0.571 0.005 112.998**
Yr 2005 0.686 0.005 140.757**
Yr 2006 0.756 0.005 160.369**
Yr 2007 0.824 0.005 174.231**




**Significant at the 5%, or higher level, of significance.
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Table D: Liverpool
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 10.267 0.010 977.921**
House Type
Detached 0.125 0.008 15.994**
Terraced -0.152 0.006 -26.672**
Bungalow 0.128 0.013 9.581**
Flat -0.034 0.008 -4.066**
Number of Bathrooms 0.117 0.005 21.849**
Number of Toilets 0.057 0.004 13.697**
Number of Garages 0.102 0.005 22.469**
Number of Garage Spaces 0.043 0.003 16.398**
Garden -0.056 0.007 -8.352**
Size (in square metres) 0.003 0.000 52.314**
Availability of Central Heating
None -0.065 0.006 -11.774**
Partial -0.012 0.005 -2.249**
Age of Property
Pre-1919 0.070 0.007 10.153**
1919-1945 0.130 0.006 22.866**
1945-1960 0.039 0.007 5.570**
New 0.110 0.008 13.522**
Acorn Classification
A 0.598 0.013 44.689**
B 0.416 0.010 41.192**
C 0.470 0.011 42.314**
D 0.452 0.011 39.993**
EFG 0.330 0.006 56.030**
H 0.224 0.006 38.875**
J 0.030 0.013 2.257**
Time
Yr 2002 0.158 0.008 20.013**
Yr 2003 0.386 0.008 51.218**
Yr 2004 0.625 0.008 80.198**
Yr 2005 0.739 0.007 100.985**
Yr 2006 0.783 0.007 109.475**
Yr 2007 0.814 0.007 112.168**




**Significant at the 5%, or higher level, of significance.
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Table E: Greater London
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 11.499 0.004 2940.455**
House Type
Detached 0.223 0.005 45.849**
Semi-detached 0.208 0.003 67.335**
Terraced 0.165 0.002 70.117**
Bungalow 0.267 0.008 34.091**
Number of Bathrooms 0.254 0.002 137.899**
Number of Toilets 0.064 0.002 40.188**
Number of Garages 0.035 0.002 17.343**
Number of Garage Spaces 0.012 0.001 9.728**
Garden 0.048 0.002 22.272**
Size (in square metres) 0.004 0.000 167.389**
Availability of Central Heating
None -0.023 0.002 -9.640**
Partial -0.029 0.004 -7.933**
Age of Property
1919-1945 -0.100 0.002 -44.586**
1945-1960 -0.183 0.003 -59.782**
1960+ -0.211 0.002 -96.259**
New -0.178 0.004 -42.480**
Acorn Classification
A 0.020 0.005 4.085**
B -0.126 0.005 -27.624**
C -0.227 0.008 -29.390**
EFG -0.294 0.002 -124.190**
H -0.373 0.003 -120.579**
IK -0.483 0.003 -138.289**
J -0.291 0.002 -124.842**
Time
Yr 2002 0.163 0.003 47.055**
Yr 2003 0.245 0.004 69.459**
Yr 2004 0.279 0.003 82.525**
Yr 2005 0.330 0.003 107.994**
Yr 2006 0.420 0.003 140.998**
Yr 2007 0.523 0.003 178.558**




**Significant at the 5%, or higher level, of significance.
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Table F: Greater Manchester
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 10.082 0.006 1580.512**
House Type
Detached 0.233 0.005 46.175**
Semi-detached 0.133 0.003 38.038**
Bungalow 0.218 0.007 30.836**
Flat 0.111 0.006 20.015**
Number of Bathrooms 0.153 0.003 47.627**
Number of Toilets 0.054 0.003 20.702**
Number of Garages 0.087 0.003 33.226**
Number of Garage Spaces 0.061 0.001 41.786**
Garden -0.083 0.004 -20.070**
Size (in square metres) 0.003 0.000 94.968**
Availability of Central Heating
None -0.036 0.004 -10.072**
Partial -0.062 0.007 -9.517**
Age of Property
Pre-1919 0.102 0.004 26.737**
1919-1945 0.082 0.004 22.602**
1945-1960 0.006 0.005 1.408
New 0.110 0.005 22.106**
Acorn Classification
A 0.712 0.007 106.397**
B 0.449 0.005 93.784**
C 0.437 0.006 67.623**
D 0.508 0.006 81.769**
EFG 0.337 0.004 95.624**
H 0.191 0.004 52.921**
J -0.023 0.007 -3.168**
Time
Yr 2002 0.168 0.005 34.905**
Yr 2003 0.332 0.005 70.920**
Yr 2004 0.545 0.005 117.642**
Yr 2005 0.651 0.004 147.466**
Yr 2006 0.708 0.004 166.047**
Yr 2007 0.759 0.004 180.704**




**Significant at the 5%, or higher level, of significance.
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Table G: Newcastle
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 10.509 0.012 856.103**
House Type
Detached 0.084 0.007 11.668**
Terraced -0.089 0.005 -16.156**
Bungalow 0.102 0.009 10.794**
Flat -0.173 0.007 -23.150**
Number of Bathrooms 0.144 0.005 28.842**
Number of Toilets 0.052 0.004 13.255**
Number of Garages 0.121 0.004 30.089**
Number of Garage Spaces 0.035 0.003 11.565**
Garden -0.014 0.007 -2.056**
Size (in square metres) 0.003 0.000 55.719**
Availability of Central Heating
None 0.017 0.006 2.962**
Partial -0.064 0.010 -6.671**
Age of Property
Pre-1919 0.114 0.006 17.712**
1919-1945 0.062 0.006 11.064**
1945-1960 0.016 0.006 2.555**
New 0.093 0.008 11.883**
Acorn Classification
A 0.569 0.012 47.837**
B 0.348 0.009 40.009**
C 0.350 0.010 33.478**
D 0.465 0.009 54.551**
EFG 0.270 0.005 49.393**
H 0.151 0.006 25.714**
J 0.071 0.011 6.552**
Time
Yr 2002 0.237 0.010 23.525**
Yr 2003 0.382 0.009 41.649**
Yr 2004 0.527 0.009 58.073**
Yr 2005 0.575 0.009 62.962**
Yr 2006 0.611 0.009 68.039**
Yr 2007 0.663 0.009 73.474**




**Significant at the 5%, or higher level, of significance
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